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Abstract. In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein
solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes
that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not
imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria
may exist. This paper demonstrates that the Rubinstein solution applies
not only to unique bargaining problems but to repeated bargaining
problems as well. It demonstrates that stationarity holds also in
Muthoo's model, and it shows that a certain result of Muthoo which
makes the split of bargaining gains independent of the discount factors is
no relevant case as the discounted sum of each agent's utility is infinite.
The paper introduces an alternative approach which takes into account
that offers may cover also future realizations by employing future
contracts. It shows that the agreement depends crucially on the
enforceability of contracts if bargaining behavior fulfils a rationality
condition.Bargaining in a long-term relationship and the Rubinstein solution
1. Introduction
If the division of bargaining gains between two agents is governed by a well-defined
sequential bargaining process, the pioneering work of Rubinstein (1982) has
demonstrated that the equilibrium division of bargaining gains is unique in quite a lot
of cases. Especially when delay costs can be determined by discount factors, a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium is guaranteed. As the sequential influence can be reduced
by assuming sufficiently small periods between two consecutive offers, quite a lot of
bargaining problems can be solved by strategic bargaining models. Since these models
rely on strategies of the bargaining agents and employ subgame-perfect equilibria, they
are able to explain a bargaining outcome in a non-cooperative bargaining setting in
which no third party is able to enforce a certain split of bargaining gains (for papers
reviewing bargaining theory, see e.g. Binmore, Osborne, Rubinstein, 1992, and Sutton,
1986).
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries
over on repeated bargaining situations. In his paper, disagreement over the partition of
a pie implies not only delay for the realization under consideration but for all future
realizations as well. Muthoo finds that stationary equilibria for such a repeated
bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary
equilibria may exist. He states a folk theorem that"... almost any path of play can be
supported by a perfect equilibrium" (p. 596) under conditions which are weaker than
those of the well-known folk theorem in repeated games. Muthoo therefore concludes
that the Rubinstein solution is not invulnerable to repetition such that the uniqueness
property does not hold if there is a chance for a further bargaining round.
This paper will deal with the issue of repetition in bargaining in two different
theoretical frameworks. Both assume that delay in current bargaining delays futurerealizations as well. The first framework will adopt the Muthoo-model which assumes
that offers can be made only for the next partition of the pie. The paper will determine
the perfect stationary equilibrium and will demonstrate that - contrary to Muthoo's
result - no non-stationary equilibrium and hence no folk theorem exists in that
framework. Additionally, it will show that a certain result of Muthoo which makes the
split of bargaining gains independent of the discount factors is no relevant case as the
discounted sum of each agent's utility is infinite. The second framework will take the
position that offers may not be restricted to the partition of the next available pie but
are in principle possible for all future realizations. This approach captures the idea that
agents are aware of future realizations and may sign a future contract. The relevance of
future contracts will be shown to depend on the enforceability of long-run agreements.
The paper will introduce the condition of rational bargaining behavior, and it will
determine the unique equilibrium in this setting. As a result, the paper will show that
the Rubinstein solution is also relevant when the chances of splitting a pie are repeated
and delay in bargaining over the partition of the current pie delays the availability of
future pies as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the model assumptions. Section 3
determines the bargaining result when bargaining is restricted to one-period offers.
Section 4 discusses the role of long-term contracts for repeated bargaining with
unlimited offers. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model assumptions
If delay in bargaining over the partition of the current pie did not delay the availability
of future pies, all bargaining problems could be separated and be solved by
Rubinstein's approach. In many cases, however, not the availability of the pie is
repeated but only the chances for future pies. Consider for example a bilateral
monopoly between a buyer and a seller. The seller produces an indivisible good at acertain cost and the buyer enjoys a certain utility by consuming this good (which
should not fall short of production cost). If consumption lasts one period after which
the good is completely depreciated, both can be expected to look for another
realization after this period. Obviously, delay in bargaining for the first realization
delays the possible next realization and hence all future realizations as well.
The model of this paper assumes that instantaneous consumption determines the utility
of each agent. It adopts quite similar assumptions as Mothoo's paper. It assumes two
agents A and B the discount factors of both are denoted by b\ and 8g, respectively.
Both agents may split a pie of unity size only unanimously. The time interval between
two consecutive offers is denoted by A, and the time interval between previous
agreement and the subsequent earliest realization is denoted by x. Muthoo defines two
different discount factors which refer to A and x, respectively. However, it is more
convenient to use only one discount factor for each agent. Additionally, the definition
of the discount factors via the natural exponential function which Muthoo employs
(such that e.g. 8^ = e
 r'
T with r^\ as agent A's interest rate) is only an approximation
for low x's. This paper will not approximate the discount factor by a natural
exponential function but will employ only the discount factors.
Contrary to Muthoo, the model assumes that it is agent A who makes the first offer for
every partition of the pie. This assumption facilitates the determination of the perfect
equilibrium. Additionally, the paper (as well as the main body of Muthoo's paper)
suppresses the influence of first-mover advantages by assuming a sufficiently small A
such that this assumption plays no role when first-mover advantages are eliminated.
An offer of agent A is either accepted or rejected by agent B. If accepted, the shares
will be consumed at once. If rejected, both have to wait for a period of A, after which
it is up to B to make an offer, an so on. The next pie will be available after a period of
x from the previous agreement on (and not from previous availability on).
xj (1 - xt) will denote the share of the unity pie which agent A (B) receives not earlier
than after t*x has elapsed. Hence, t*x indicates the earliest #t realization, given that nodelay has occurred before. If n delays in previous bargaining rounds have occurred, #t
realization is not possible before t*T + n*A has elapsed. Of course, if there is infinite
disagreement over any partition before, #t realization will never be possible in finite
time. This paper will assume that the utilities can be defined by payoff functions such
that utility is transferable. In general, the instantaneous utilities are defined by (1):
(1) UA=V(xt)-^, Vx>0,Vxx<0,V(0) = 0,'
UB=W(xt) +
 vF, Wx<0, WXX>O,W(1) = O.





In this case, agent A's marginal utility is higher than agent B's marginal utility over the
whole range. When bargaining is restricted to one realization, it is obviously efficient
to give the whole pie to agent A and to compensate agent B by transfers because the
total sum of bargaining gains are maximized when they are a. Hence, different
marginal utilities decouple the distribution of the pie and the distribution of bargaining
gains. Only if both agents' utility functions are identical and bargaining is restricted to
one realization, transfers do not play any role. Such utility functions are employed by
Muthoo and will be employed in section 3:
(2) V(x,) = xt, W(x,) = l-xt.
The first pie is assumed to be available in 0.
3. Repeated bargaining with one-period offers
This section assumes that every offer does only cover the next possible realization of
bargaining gains. Then, delay in agreement over a certain partition implies delay forthe availability of all future pies. The model employing one-period offers only
assumes also that every agent expects the next realizations to occur as early as
possible, given the delay in current bargaining. It should be noted that this assumption
is not without conceptual difficulty: when delay plays a role for current bargaining, it
should also play a role for future bargaining. Hence, this assumption specifies that
delay is possible in current bargaining but not expected to occur in future bargaining.
The conceptual difficulty is that the feature of no delay as the result of the bargaining
process determines the expectation before current bargaining. Instead, one could take
the alternative assumption that any potential delay is expected to lead to further delay
in all future bargaining situations.
Throughout this section, the utility functions are given by (2). The perfect equilibrium
can be most easily determined by employing the table of Shaked and Sutton (1984):














payoff of agent B
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1-x,
Table 1 develops the subgame-perfect bargaining equilibrium for the partition of #t
pie. Shaked and Sutton (1984) have demonstrated that the equilibrium can bedetermined by going backwards for two bargaining stages. Suppose that xt gives a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in 2A in which A makes a proposal. In A, B makes a
proposal and knows that A accepts a proposal which makes him indifferent between
realizing xt in 2A and realizing x^' in A. xt' is the discounted xj minus the discounted
utility of agent A to realize all future partitions of the pie A time units earlier than it
were possible after realization in 2A. ^S^'^XJJ denotes the discounted utility of
o=t+l
future realizations, given that they occur as early as possible, and [l -5AJ measures
the time preference for realizing them A time units earlier. In 0, agent A knows that
agent B accepts a proposal which makes him indifferent between realizing 1 - x^' in A
and realizing 1 - \(' in 0. A similar line of reasoning determines 1 - x^".
These solutions are interior solutions and mirror a subgame-perfect equilibrium only if
(4) 5
AAxt>[l-
holds. If (4) is violated, corner solutions define a perfect equilibrium such that either
agent A or agent B receives the whole pie. (4) is likely to be fulfilled for high discount
factors and/or low A's. (4) ensures also that the sums are finite.
As the game in 2A is the same as in 0, subgame-perfection requires
x. =
given that (4) holds. Shaked and Sutton (1984) have proven that a unique equilibrium
exists for the partition of a single pie by considering the maximum and the minimum
bargaining gains of agent A which can be shown to fall together. For stationaryequilibria, this line of reasoning is also valid for a repeated bargaining game with one-
period offers: Let the stationary equilibrium partition of the pie be denoted by x.
Suppose first that x defines the maximum bargaining gains of agent A, and second that
x defines the minimum bargaining gains of agent A. Then it is plain to see that
maximum and minimum bargaining gains fall together.
For a stationary equilibrium, an interior solution exists if A falls short of x:
(6) A<x=> —^->—^r,
xl because x'<x.
1 -oB 1 ~oB
Condition (6) specifies that the period between two consecutive offers is small
compared to the chances of realizations. This is no strong condition but a natural
assumption as it requires that communication is quick whereas chances for splitting a
pie are few. Then, (7) gives the unique stationary equilibrium partition:
(7) A
(7) is a generalization of the bargaining model for a single pie which can be
determined by the limit of (7) for x—»<*> which indicates that no further realization
occurs:
l-bA6B
(8) gives the standard result of strategic bargaining models. In (7), the impact of the
discount factors is twofold: first, they determine the preference for an early realization
of both the current realization and the future pies, second, they define the discountedutility sum of future realizations. Applying L'Hopital's Rule on (7) and (8) gives the
division of bargaining gains for infinitely small bargaining periods:
(9) hmx = -, z—:=x,
A-»O s l ~ 1 ln8A —- +ln8t B1-8B
(10) limx = limx =
A,o t. ln8A + ln8B
(9) and (10) do not fall together unless identical discount factors are assumed and/or
no further realization will occur. The equilibrium partitions in (9) and (10) differ
because (9) contains a compensating effect not included in (10). Consider for example
two agents A and B with d\ = 0.9 and 8g = 0.7. According to (10), the perfect
bargaining equilibrium gave agent A 0.772 units and agent B 0.228 units of the pie
because the threat of delay is more severe for agent B. (9), however, includes also the
effect on the availability of future pies, and the discounted utility of future pies is
ceteris paribus higher for agent A (because \ (l — 8^) > y (l — 8B)). Hence, a strong
bargaining position of A is compensated by a higher weight for the future pies which
make the threat of delay with respect to future pies more severe for him. For x = 1,
agent A receives 0.53 units and agent B receives 0.47 units of the pie. This result
demonstrates that a relatively higher discount factor has a twofold impact on
bargaining power: it is increased through the threat of current delay but decreased
through the high discounted utility of future realizations. Even if an agent, say A, were
perfectly patient, he would not receive the whole pie due to a higher weight of future
realizations:




1 1 _ l-oB
In8nx 'B
(11) demonstrates that neither agent is able to seize the whole pie in this setting unless
the other agent's discount factor is zero. But this result is no contradiction of theRubinstein solution but a clarification that the impact of delay on the discounted utility
of both agents must be taken into account in such a setting.
Muthoo discusses also the case that x—>0 (A is assumed to shrink infinitely faster) such
that the periods between possible realizations become small. Again applying
L'Hopital's Rule gives a seemingly surprising equal split result:
(12) limx = -.
Although (12) apparently indicates that the discount factors do not play any role under
certain assumptions, this result is irrelevant as it holds only for factual abundance of
pies:
Proposition 1: Repeated strategic bargaining with one-period offers gives a unique
stationary perfect equilibrium. It depends on both agents discount
factors unless the discounted utility of each agent is infinite.




(12) demonstrates that a shrinking x leads to an irrelevant bargaining problem because
both discounted utilities approach infinity. If both agent are in paradise, they do not
have to care about scarcities, and it is obvious that an equal split which gives both an
infinite utility is a perfect equilibrium.
The second part of Muthoo's paper discusses non-stationary equilibria for identical
discount factors. In his paper, a folk theorem is stated such that all possible paths are
sustained under relatively mild conditions. If it is not required that (5) holds for all t10
but for 0 only, this result is obvious because a lot of paths may fulfil (5) for t = 0. But
the restriction to 0 neglects that future pies are also subject to bargaining. If one
considers any #t realization such that dynamic paths must fulfil (5) for all t > 0, the
following proposition states that no folk theorem holds:
Proposition 2: Repeated strategic bargaining with one-period offers and identical
discount factors gives only a unique stationary perfect equilibrium but
no non-stationary perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Let the identical discount factors of both agents be denoted by 8. If (4) were not
fulfilled and hence xt € {0,1}, no dynamic path would exist but one agent would
receive the whole pie in all periods. This result holds also for different discount
factors, and it can be shown that identical discount factors rule out corner solutions
(substituting 5 for §A and 8B in (5) shows that (5) is always fulfilled).
In the case of an interior solution, (5) may be simplified, and substituting 8 for 8 A and
8g leads to (14).
The sum term comprises all future realizations. Let Pt denote the sum term which
enters the determination of x^:
(15) pi:= |
a=t+i °




 xt+l» respectively. From (14) and (15), one may determine the








must hold. Now assume that any x^ surmounts X{_i strictly:
(19) xt>xt_, => xt>-—-Pt(see(15)), o
=> xt+1-xt<0(see(17)).
(19) demonstrates that any dynamic path which reaches any t for which xt surmounts
xt_i implies that xt+i falls short of xt, and that both xt+j and xt surmount
Now assume that any xt falls strictly short of xt_]:
1 — S
x
(20) xt<xt_, => xt<-^—-Msee(15)),
6
=> xt+1 -xt>0(see(17)).
(20) demonstrates that any dynamic path which reaches any t for which xt falls short
of xt_i implies that x^+i surmounts xj, and that both xl+\ and xt fall short of
[l — 6
t]p,/5
x. Together, (19) and (20) define the condition that every dynamic path
must increase (decrease) x when x was decreased (increased) in the previous period.12
Consider three consecutive periods u, v and w of a dynamic path such that v = u + 1
and w = u + 1. From (19) and (20), it is known that either xu > xv, xv < xw or xu < xv,
Ay ^ Xvy.









(21) reveals a contradiction in both cases because (16) contradicts (19) or (20),
respectively. Q.e.d.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the Rubinstein solution is still relevant in this setting:
first, no non-stationary equilibria exist for identical discount factors, second, the
stationary equilibrium depends on the discount factors in all relevant cases, third, the
difference between the standard result and the stationary equilibrium in this setting
accrues to a utility definition in this setting which itself depends on the individual
discount factor.
4. Repeated bargaining with unlimited offers
The last section employed a model of one-period offers such that bargaining was only
allowed for the next partition of the pie. This is a very restrictive assumption because
it rules out that a proposal can be submitted simultaneously for partition of another pie.13
fa, ,** f"<
In general, both agents are able to anticipate which bargaining results are to be
expected in the future. As the threat of delay is only credible if delay can occur, i.e. if
the pie is available, bargaining results should not change if an agreement has been
found before realizations can occur. In this setting, proposals may be submitted for all
future partitions, and this section assumes that every agent may make proposals which
are in principle unlimited. As in the case of unique bargaining, a proposal will not
specify any delay but partitions for the earliest realizations possible at the very
moment of the proposal. Then, a proposal submitted before 0 may comprise all future




The structure of bargaining with unlimited offers
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In Figure 1, the vertical line depicts the time axis. The time axis starts with the first
option for agent A to make a proposal to agent B. Additionally, Figure 1 assumes that
it is A's move to submit a proposal when the pie is available unless an agreement has
been found before. Agent A will anticipate what will happen when the future pies are14
available (depicted by the vertical lines). Hence, he may make a proposal which covers
the partition of all future pies. In the following, it will be assumed that one agent has
submitted a proposal for all future realizations which was accepted by the other agent.
This assumption is not restrictive because it makes no difference whether all future
results are anticipated by both agents or result from explicit bilateral acceptance. If
agreement over the partition of all future pies is delayed as it is indicated by the dotted
line, the arrows show that all future realizations for which a proposal is submitted are
delayed as well.
In general, it depends on the enforceability of long-term contracts how the
unanimously accepted proposals look like. The role of enforceability for bargaining for
a long-term relationship has not yet been explored (the only exemption to my
knowledge is Okada, 1991), although enforceability is essential for agreements.
Agents bargaining for a long-term relationship may sign a contract over future
partitions which covers a certain number of realizations. If enforceable, unilateral
revision is not possible because enforceable contracts can only be changed
unanimously. Let T denotes the number of realizations which are enforceable such that
any contract specifying T or less realizations will be enforced by third parties whereas
any contract which specifies more than T periods can be quit unilaterally by one agent.
In German law, for example, contracts which cover a very long period are immoral
(contra bones mores) with the implication that they may be quit unilaterally after a
certain duration.
Enforceability implies that once an agreement is accepted, it may only be changed
unanimously by both agents. Unanimous change of an agreement, however, cannot
occur under perfect information because perfect information makes every bargaining
result renegotiation-proof. Figure 2 shows the bargaining structure for a long-term
relationship which includes unilaterally restarting bargaining after #T realization.15
Figure 2: Bargaining and Restarting Bargaining
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Figure 2 indicates that an agreed-upon partition of the pie may be subject to revision in
periods later than T unless the pie under consideration was already consumed. Figure 2
shows that each agent may then restart bargaining unilaterally by submitting an
alternative proposal after another proposal was already accepted.16
When bargaining has led to an agreement for a future partition, this partition is a
credible agreement only if neither agent wants to restart bargaining over some
partitions. For example, agent A may propose a partition for all future pies and B may
accept this proposal before the first realization can occur. This agreement must be
invulnerable to a restarting bargaining initiated by A or B in the future. This
requirement leads to the condition of time-consistent bargaining behavior:
Definition 1: Time-consistent bargaining behavior implies that neither agent can
successfully restart bargaining for realizations for which an agreement
was already found.
Time-consistent bargaining behavior sets the stage for defining rational bargaining
behavior:
Definition 2: Rational bargaining behavior determines a bargaining result which
leaves no mutual improvement unexploited subject to time-consistent
bargaining behavior. Under identical conditions, rational bargaining
behavior implies identical results.
Note that neither time-consistent bargaining behavior nor rational bargaining behavior
define conditions only for strategic bargaining models. Definition 1 requires that the
dynamic path is not subject to revision, and Definition 2 requires additionally
efficiency subject to time-consistency and identity of results under identical
conditions. Both definitions apply to every bargaining model which does not result in
delay in bargaining and inefficiency.
Rational bargaining behavior implies Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Rational bargaining behavior implies partitions of all future
realizations which consist of identical subagreements which are
repeated. Each of these subagreements covers exactly T periods.17
Proof: Consider an agreement which covers all future realizations. Except for the first
T periods, this agreement need not to be explicit such that all future partitions beyond
T are specified but the partitions of future pies are at least anticipated by both agents.
The first T periods will be laid down in an enforceable contract because maximization
of joint bargaining gains for less than T periods cannot give higher utilities than
maximization of joint bargaining gains for T periods (recall that utility is transferable).
Choosing a contract with shorter duration would leave bargaining gains unexploited
because intertemporal utility maximization will be shown to imply a dynamic path
which would be cut by a shorter duration. The partitions of future pies are depicted in
Figure 3:
Figure 3: » Future partitions and rational bargaining behavior
h—I h-H h-M >
 l
0 1 T-l T T+l 2T-1 2T 2T+1
The partitions denoted by a bar give the whole stream of future realizations which are
agreed upon or anticipated. They are at least credibly agreed upon from 0 to T - 1
which covers the period of T enforceable realizations. All other partitions are agreed
upon although they may be subject to further bargaining (or anticipated as the result of





Assume that {XQ,...,^^} and {xT,...,x2T_,} differ such that (22) does not hold.
After period T-l, each agent may restart bargaining unilaterally. If {xo,...,xT_,} was
agreed upon before 0, the same partition for T to 2T - 1 should be accepted by both
agents when submitted because the situation before T is the same as before 0. No
agent will submit this enforceable agreement if (23) holds:18
2T-1 ,,1-1 # 2T-1 T-l
(23)
t=T t=0 t=T t=0
(23), however, requires that the previously agreed-upon enforceable part of the
agreement is Pareto-dominated by another agreement. Hence, both agents could be
better off by specifying {xT,..., x2T_,} for 0 to T - 1, and therefore (23) contradicts the
condition of rational bargaining behavior. If
(24)
holds, both agents gain by switching to the old partition plan before T. Because
rational bargaining behavior assumes that identical conditions imply identical
bargaining results, only the repetition of {xo,...,xT_,} defines a dynamic path which
satisfies rational bargaining behavior. Q.e.d.
One may now turn to efficiency in these subagreements. As the model assumes that
utility is transferable, both agents seek to maximize the total gains, and then they
bargain for a split of total bargaining gains. When an agreement for which a dynamic







T t=l ' '
Maximization of (25) gives the necessary conditions (26):
If the linear utility functions (2) are assumed, (26) implies corner solutions such that
the more patient agent receives all pies. In this case, the more patient agent, say agent
A, has a higher intertemporal efficiency because receiving all pies during the
subagreement gives him [l - 5A]/[l -5A] which maximizes both agents' total19












- = 0 if 5A = 8B. A
 B
dt
(27) uses the sufficient condition for a maximum to demonstrate that the more patient
agent receives a higher share in late periods, and the more impatient agent receives a
lower share in early periods.
For example, logarithmic utility functions yield:
V(xt) = lnx,, W(xt) = ln(l-xt)=>
O* dx t —1 r~ _ it-2rc. r. T
X







(26) does not induce a certain split of bargaining gains but gives the condition for
intertemporal maximization of bargaining gains. Let QT denote the maximum
bargaining gains:
(28)
The agreement specifies the individual shares of the pie from 1 to T and - as a result of
bargaining - a certain utility transfer. (27) demonstrates that a dynamic path maximizes
the sum of both agents bargaining gains unless both discount factors equalize.
Identical discount factors imply a stationary path.20
Let the utility functions which give the individual utility of the subagreement be
denoted by V and W. V and W are functions of the shares of the total bargaining
gains received after utility transfer HP from agent A to agent B:
(29) V = v[(0
T]
In (29), O)T denotes the share of total maximized bargaining gains which agent A
receives, and Hr* denotes the utility transferred at the beginning of the agreement. Due
to (1) and (28), both utilities are increasing and strictly non-convex with respect to the
shares each agent receives.
When both agents anticipate that every subagreement of length T is infinitely repeated,
they bargain for a stream of identical, repeated subagreements. The discounted utility
of all future realizations is determined by 1/(1-5^
x) or y(l —8g
T), respectively,
times the discounted utility from the subagreement. Then, the shares of the total
bargaining gains after utility transfer can be also determined by the table of Shaked
and Sutton:21
















1 — oA 1 — oB
In A, it is up to agent B to submit a proposal, and he knows that agent A is indifferent
between realizing V[(O
/T]/(l - 5^) or 5AV[CO
T]/(1-8^) tomorrow. The same
reasoning gives (o"T, and subgame-perfection requires that G)"T=G>T. Note that this
model ensures interior solutions because
This section employs the general utility function (1) such that the perfect equilibrium







(30) indicates that agent A is prepared to acknowledge certain concessions in order to
realize the agreement not in 2A but in A. Similarly, agent B is prepared to22
acknowledge certain concessions in order to realize the agreement not in A but in 0. In
a perfect equilibrium, the equilibrium concessions 7 equalize such that neither agent
can gain by waiting for his next offer opportunity. (30) implies equilibrium utilities:
(31) demonstrates that the equilibrium concession 7 decrease with A. Hence, (31) may
be approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion around G)T for sufficiently small 7's
guaranteed by small A's. Using the Taylor expansion and eliminating 7 yields
(32) p:=.
p denotes the ratio of impatience, whereas the term on the RHS denotes the marginal
rate of substitution between the utility of agent B and the utility of agent A. The
discount factor terms containing Tx drop out because they are cancelled by division of
Wx and Vx through W and V, respectively. (32) holds for sufficiently small 7's
guaranteed by sufficiently small A's such that bargaining for an infinite stream of
realizations gives the same result as bargaining for a single subagreement. When the
bargaining period between two consecutive offers becomes negligibly (instead of




(26), (28), (32) and (33) determine the bargaining result for enforceability of T
realizations and negligibly small bargaining periods. (26) and (28) give the partitions
of the pies of each subagreement, and (32) and (33) determine the division of total
bargaining gains. Unless T is one and/or both agents' discount factors equalize, every23
subagreement will specify an intertemporal path in order to exploit intertemporal
efficiency gains.
T = 1 means enforceability of the next realization only. In this case, the perfect
equilibrium is given by
W / r.1




For T = 1, the condition of rational bargaining behavior implies a stationary path of
bargaining results because any alternative path were subject to restarting bargaining.
Hence, strategic bargaining in an institutional setting which supports the enforceability
of one-period contracts leads to repetition of the standard Rubinstein solution.
5. Concluding remark
This paper has discussed the relevance of the Rubinstein solution when bargaining is
repeated. It has demonstrated that the Rubinstein solution applies not only to unique
bargaining problems but to repeated bargaining problems as well. The paper has
revealed that repeated bargaining may be modelled by future contracts. Then, it
depends crucially on the enforceability of future contracts how the unanimously
agreed-upon partition of bargaining gains looks like. The paper has introduced the
notion of rational bargaining behavior which requires time-consistent bargaining
behavior. An agreement over future partitions fulfils the condition of time-consistent
bargaining behavior if it is invulnerable to restarting bargaining.
The paper has demonstrated that rational bargaining behavior implies repetition of the
standard Rubinstein solution when only one-period contracts are enforceable. This
result does also hold for the strategic bargaining equilibrium in a non-cooperative
environment which is neither able to enforce a certain split of bargaining gains nor
able to enforce any contract. Consider for example an infinitely repeated prisoners'24
dilemma game with infinite action space and potential delay due to disagreement when
actions are to be coordinated, and let the non-cooperative equilibrium be defined by
zero utilities for both agents. Due to the folk theorem for repeated games, it is well-
known that the set of equilibria which are sustained by a history-dependent strategy
increases with the discount factors (for history-dependent strategies see Abreu, 1988,
and Farrell, Maskin, 1989). Then, certain history-dependent strategies and certain
discount factors of A and B imply a Pareto frontier such that every outcome on this
frontier is sustained by repetition and not dominated by any other outcome on the
frontier. If the frontier defines a convex and differentiable solution set, strategic
bargaining for such a self-enforcing agreement leads to (34) with general utility
functions substituted for those which were used for a partition of a pie of unity size.
More details on joining strategic bargaining theory with cooperation in a non-
cooperative environment can be found in Stahler (1996).
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